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Yale ECON 159: Game Theory
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01-Introduction: Five First Lessons
01-Introduction: Five First Lessons
02-Putting Yourselves into Other People's Shoes
02-Putting Yourselves into Other People's Shoes
03-Iterative Deletion and the Median-Voter Theorem
03-Iterative Deletion and the Median-Voter Theorem
04-Best Responses in Soccer and Business Partnerships
04-Best Responses in Soccer and Business Partnerships
05-Nash Equilibrium: Bad Fashion and Bank Runs
05-Nash Equilibrium: Bad Fashion and Bank Runs
06-Nash Equilibrium: Dating and Cournot
06-Nash Equilibrium: Dating and Cournot
07-Nash Equilibrium: Shopping, Standing and Voting on a Line
07-Nash Equilibrium: Shopping, Standing and Voting on a Line
08-Nash Equilibrium: Location, Segregation and Randomization
08-Nash Equilibrium: Location, Segregation and Randomization
09-Mixed Strategies in Theory and Tennis
09-Mixed Strategies in Theory and Tennis
10-Mixed Strategies in Baseball, Dating and Paying Your Taxes
10-Mixed Strategies in Baseball, Dating and Paying Your Taxes
11-Evolutionary Stability: Cooperation, Mutation, and Equilibrium
11-Evolutionary Stability: Cooperation, Mutation, and Equilibrium
12-Evolutionary Stability: Social Convention, Aggression, and Cycles
12-Evolutionary Stability: Social Convention, Aggression, and Cycles
13-Sequential Games: Moral Hazard, Incentives, and Hungry Lions
13-Sequential Games: Moral Hazard, Incentives, and Hungry Lions
14-Backward Induction: Commitment, Spies, and First-Mover Advantages
14-Backward Induction: Commitment, Spies, and First-Mover Advantages
15-Backward Induction: Chess, Strategies, and Credible Threats
15-Backward Induction: Chess, Strategies, and Credible Threats
16-Backward Induction: Reputation and Duels
16-Backward Induction: Reputation and Duels
17-Backward Induction: Ultimatums and Bargaining
17-Backward Induction: Ultimatums and Bargaining
18-Imperfect Information: Information Sets and Sub-Game Perfection
18-Imperfect Information: Information Sets and Sub-Game Perfection
19-Subgame Perfect Equilibrium: Matchmaking and Strategic Investments
19-Subgame Perfect Equilibrium: Matchmaking and Strategic Investments
20-Subgame Perfect Equilibrium: Wars of Attrition
20-Subgame Perfect Equilibrium: Wars of Attrition
21-Repeated Games: Cooperation vs. the End Game
21-Repeated Games: Cooperation vs. the End Game
22-Repeated Games: Cheating, Punishment, and Outsourcing
22-Repeated Games: Cheating, Punishment, and Outsourcing
23-Asymmetric Information: Silence, Signaling and Suffering Education
23-Asymmetric Information: Silence, Signaling and Suffering Education
24-Asymmetric Information: Auctions and the Winner's Curse
24-Asymmetric Information: Auctions and the Winner's Curse
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16-Backward Induction: Reputation and Duels
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