Defines mixed strategies as probability distributions over pure strategies and explains how to calculate their expected payoffs, using Battle of the Sexes as an example.
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Yale ECON 159: Game Theory
All
- 01-Introduction: Five First Lessons
01-Introduction: Five First Lessons
- 02-Putting Yourselves into Other People's Shoes
- 03-Iterative Deletion and the Median-Voter Theorem
- 04-Best Responses in Soccer and Business Partnerships
- 05-Nash Equilibrium: Bad Fashion and Bank Runs
- 06-Nash Equilibrium: Dating and Cournot
- 07-Nash Equilibrium: Shopping, Standing and Voting on a Line
- 08-Nash Equilibrium: Location, Segregation and Randomization
- 09-Mixed Strategies in Theory and Tennis
- 10-Mixed Strategies in Baseball, Dating and Paying Your Taxes
- 11-Evolutionary Stability: Cooperation, Mutation, and Equilibrium
- 12-Evolutionary Stability: Social Convention, Aggression, and Cycles
- 13-Sequential Games: Moral Hazard, Incentives, and Hungry Lions
- 14-Backward Induction: Commitment, Spies, and First-Mover Advantages
- 15-Backward Induction: Chess, Strategies, and Credible Threats
- 16-Backward Induction: Reputation and Duels
- 17-Backward Induction: Ultimatums and Bargaining
- 18-Imperfect Information: Information Sets and Sub-Game Perfection
- 19-Subgame Perfect Equilibrium: Matchmaking and Strategic Investments
- 20-Subgame Perfect Equilibrium: Wars of Attrition
- 21-Repeated Games: Cooperation vs. the End Game
- 22-Repeated Games: Cheating, Punishment, and Outsourcing
- 23-Asymmetric Information: Silence, Signaling and Suffering Education
- 24-Asymmetric Information: Auctions and the Winner's Curse