Explains why personhood-based death cannot mean a lapse in functioning, and proposes inability to engage in person-functioning as the distinction between being alive and dead. Applies the view to sleep, resurrection, and coma.
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Yale PHIL 176: Death
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01-Course Introduction
- 02-The Nature of Persons: Dualism vs. Physicalism
- 04-Introduction to Plato's Phaedo; Arguments for the Existence of the Soul, Part II
- 05-Arguments for the Existence of the Soul, Part III: Free Will and Near-Death Experiences
- 07-Plato, Part II: Arguments for the Immortality of the Soul
- 08-Plato, Part III: Arguments for the Immortality of the Soul (cont.)
- 09-Plato, Part IV: Arguments for the Immortality of the Soul (cont.)
- 10-Personal Identity, Part I: Identity Across Space and Time and the Soul Theory
- 12-Personal Identity, Part III: Objections to the Personality Theory
- 13-Personal Identity, Part IV: What Matters?
- 14-What Matters (cont.); The Nature of Death, Part I
- 17-The Badness of Death, Part II: The Deprivation Account
- 20-The Value of Life, Part II; Other Bad Aspects of Death, Part I
- 23-How to Live Given the Certainty of Death
- 24-Suicide, Part I: The Rationality of Suicide
- 25-Suicide, Part II: Deciding under Uncertainty